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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have highlighted audio adversarial examples as a ubiquitous threat to the state-of-the-
art automatic speech recognition systems. Thorough studies on how to effectively generate adversarial
examples is essential to prevent potential attacks. Despite many research on this, the efficiency and
the robustness of existing works are not yet satisfactory. In this paper, we propose weighted-sampling
audio adversarial examples, focusing on the numbers and the weights of distortion to reinforce the
attack. Further we apply a denoising method in the loss function to make the adversarial attack more
imperceptible. Experiments show that our method is the first in the field to generate audio adversarial
examples with low noise and high audio robustness at the minute time-consuming level 1.
1 Introduction
In recent years, machine learning algorithms are widely used in various fields. While studies show that existing
learning-based algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [1, 2]. Currently, majority of the research on adversarial
examples are in the image recognition field [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], while others investigate fields such as text classification [9],
traffic classification [10], and malicious software classification [11, 12].
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) is another vital field where machine learning algorithms are also frequently
applied [13]. To date, it has been proved that audio adversarial examples can mislead ASR to transfer any audio to any
targeted phrases [14]. However, it is much more difficult to generate adversarial examples for audio than images. To
generate an effective audio adversarial example, there are still several technical challenges to be addressed:
(C1) Generating audio adversarial examples demands significant computational resources and huge time overhead. It
takes over one hour or more to generate an effective audio adversarial example by recently proposed approaches [14,
15, 16, 17]. Such inefficiency significantly undermines the practicability of the attack.
(C2) Recording and replaying, which are common operations for audio, could easily introduce extra noises. Therefore,
the robustness of adversarial examples against noise is crucial. Nevertheless, the adversarial examples prepared over
hours are still poor in robustness. The state-of-the-art audio adversarial examples [14, 18] become invalid after adding
imperceptible pointwise random noise.
(C3) Different from the image domain where lp-based metrics are carefully studied as a part of the loss function to
generate adversarial examples, there are no investigations on which kind of metric is more suitable for constructing
audio adversarial examples.
In this paper, we achieve a fast, robust adversarial example attack to ASR by proposing two novel techniques named
Weighted Perturbation Technology (WPT) and Sampling Perturbation Technology (SPT).
1We encourage you to listen to these audio adversarial examples on this anonymous websitehttps://sites.google.com/
view/audio-adversarial-examples/.
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WPT adjusts the weights of distortion at different positions of audio during the generation process, and thus generates
adversarial examples faster and improves the attack efficiency (addressing C1).
Meanwhile, by reducing the number of points to perturb based on the characteristics of context correlation in speech
recognition model, SPT can increase the robustness of audio adversarial examples (addressing C2).
To best of our knowledge, we are the first in the field to both take the factors of the weights and the numbers of perturbed
points into consideration during the generation of audio adversarial examples. And the two techniques are always
complementary to all existing ASR adversarial attacks, which by default modify every value of the entire audio vector.
Further, we also investigate different metrics as parts of the loss function to generate audio adversarial examples and
provide a reference for future researchers in this field (addressing C3).
Finally, our experiments show that our method can generate more robust audio adversarial examples in a short period
of 4 to 5 minutes. This is a substantial improvement compared to the state-of-the-art methods.
2 Related Work
Audio adversarial examples can be mainly divided into two categories, speech-to-label, and speech-to-text [19]. Speech-
to-label classifies audio into different categories and the output is a specific label. This method is inspired by a similar
method on images [18, 20]. Since the target phrases can only be chosen from a certain amount of labels, the practicality
of such a method is limited.
The speech-to-text method directly converts audio semantic information into text. Carlini & Wagner [14] are the first to
work on audio adversarial examples for the speech-to-text models and they can let ASR transcribe any audio into a
pre-specified text. However, the audio robustness is compromised and most of their examples will lose the adversarial
labels by adding imperceptible random noises.
Later on CommanderSong [16] achieved practical over-the-air audio adversarial attacks, but they only validated their
method on the music clips. Additionally Yakura & Sakuma [21] proposed another physical-world attack method.
Regardless, these two methods will introduce non-negligible noises to the original audio. Unfortunately, all of these
methods would require several hours to generate only one audio adversarial example, including the most recent
work [17].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no method to generate audio adversarial examples with low noise and high
robustness at the minute level. Our proposed method can be applied with all these current methods to achieve a trade-off
among quality, robustness and convergence speed.
3 Background
Threat Model. Before digging into details of the audio adversarial example attack, an ASR model should be selected
as the potential threat model. Following the common practice in the field we summarize three basic requirements for it:
• Its core component should be Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) such as LSTM [22], which is widely adopted
in current ASR systems;
• It is capable of applying the state-of-the-art audio adversarial attack methods, and the corresponding results
could be used as baselines in our experiments;
• It has to be open-source and thus we can directly conduct white-box tests on it.
Given requirements above, we choose the speech-to-text model, Deepspeech [23], as our experimental threat model,
which is an open-source ASR with Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC) method [24] and LSTM as its main
components. Notice that our approach can be also applied to other RNN-based ASR systems.
Considering that there are many ways to convert the black box model into a white box model [25, 26, 27], which is
another research direction, and most of the previous work also assume they know the parameters of models, hence our
research is also based on the white-box model.
Automatic Speech Recognition Model
CTC Loss Function
gredient descent
   
Adversarial example
Figure 1: General process of audio adversarial example attack.
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Audio Adversarial Examples. Figure 1 shows the general process of audio adversarial example attack. Specifically,
let x be the input audio vector and δ is the distortion to the original audio. Audio adversarial example attacks are defined
as by adding some perturbations δ, ASR recognizes x+ δ as specified malicious texts t (formally: f(x+ δ) = t), while
there is no perceivable difference for humans. The process of generating adversarial examples can be regarded as a
process of updating x using gradient descent on a predefined loss function `(·) shown in Eq. 1. The iterative process
stops until the adversarial example meets our evaluation requirements.
`(x, δ, t) = `model(f(x+ δ), t) + c · `metric(x, x+ δ) (1)
In Eq. 1, `model is the loss function used in the ASR models. For example, Carlini & Wagner [14] uses CTC-loss as the
`model. `metric is used to measure the difference between the generated adversarial examples and the original samples.
Different from the image domain where lp-based metrics are commonly used, there is no consensus on which `metric
should be applied in the audio field. For instance, so far various `metric such as SNR [16], psychoacoustic hearing
thresholds [28] and frequency masking [17] have been adopted. We will also elaborate the choices of lmetric in this
paper.
Evaluation Metric. Based on the characteristics of the audio and the common practice in the field, the following
evaluation metrics are chosen in this paper.
• SNR(Signal-to-noise ratio) measures the noise level of the distortion δ relative to the original audio x. The
smaller distortion is, the larger SNR will be,
SNR = 10 log10
Px
Pδ
, (2)
where Px and Pδ represent the energies of the original audio and the noise respectively.
• WER, i.e., the word error rate, is a common evaluation metric in the ASR domain,
WER =
S +D + I
N
× 100%, (3)
where S, D and I are the numbers of substitutions, deletions and insertions respectively, and N is the total
number of words.
• Success Rate is the ratio of examples which can be successfully recognized as the malicious target texts by
ASR,
Success Rate =
Nadv
Ntotal
× 100%, (4)
where Nadv is the number of adversarial examples that can be transcribed as target phrases and Ntotal is the
total number of adversarial examples generated.
• Robustness Rate. Adding noises to the audio x is the same as applying transformation function t ∼ T over
the input x. Here we define the robustness rate as the success ratio of examples that can still retain adversarial
property after transformed by t(·),
Robustness Rate =
Nt(adv)
Ntotal
× 100%, (5)
where Nt(adv) is the number of adversarial examples that can still be transcribed as target phrases after
transformed by t(·).
4 Methodology
In this section, first, we will show the details of sampling perturbation technology and weighted perturbation technology.
We will also explain why these methods are able to increase the robustness of adversarial examples and accelerate the
attack. Finally, we will investigate different metrics and try to find out an experiential standard to refer to, instead of
directly using the lp-based metrics on image domain.
4.1 Sampling perturbation technology
We propose SPT to increase the robustness of audio adversarial examples. It works by reducing the number of perturbed
points. Here we will explain the reason why SPT works, taking the CTC loss as an example. Actually, it’s a general
method for current audio adversarial attacks.
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We use x denote an audio vector, p denote a phrase which is the semantic information of x and y denote the probability
distribution of x decoded to p. xi is one frame of x and yi is the probability distribution over the character which is
transformed by xi.
In CTC process (shown in Figure 2 left), the process from x to p is: a) Input x ( 1 ) and get the sequences of tokens pi
( 2 ). b) Then merge the repeated characters and drop ‘-’ tokens ( 3 ). c) Output the predicted phrase p ( 4 ).
Connectionist Temporal Classication (CTC) Audio Sequence Location (ASL) Model
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Figure 2: Overview of CTC and ASL.
Because pi is the sequence of tokens to x, we say the probability of pi under y is the product of the likelihoods of each
yipii . For a given phrase p with respect to y, there will be a set of predicted sequences pi ∈
∏
(p, y). Finally, we calculate
Pr(p|y), the probability of phrase p under the distribution y, by summing the probability of each pi in the set:
Pr(p|y) =
∑
pi∈∏(p,y)
n∏
i=0
yipii (6)
In traditional audio adversarial example attack, if we want to transcribe audio x to target t, we will add slight distortion
on each pii to let t = argmax
p
Pr(p|y). However, we can also get the same result by fixing part of
n−m∏
j
yjpij and
perturbing the other part to let
m∏
k
ykpik =
m∏
k
y′kpi′k , where y
′k is the new probability distribution of perturbed pi′k and
ykpik 6= y′kpi′k :
t = argmax
p
Pr(p|y)
= argmax
p
∑
pi∈∏(p,y)
n∏
i=0
yipii
= argmax
p
∑
pi′∈∏(p,y′)
n−m∏
j=0
yjpij
m∏
k=0
y′kpi′k
(7)
Based on Formula 7, we can shorten the perturbed number of audio vector from n to m. Our evaluations give the
support that m can be much smaller than n.
Since most of the points in our adversarial examples are exactly the same as those in the original audio, this makes our
adversarial examples show very similar properties to the original audio. Compared with the adversarial examples that
all points are perturbed, environmental noise has a lower probability of affecting the SPT-based adversarial examples.
Athalye et al. [29] proposed the Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) algorithm to construct adversarial examples
that are able to maintain the adversarial property over a chosen transformation distribution T . Unfortunately, the
limitation of the EOT is that it only increases robustness under the same or similar T -distribution noises. Without the
assumption of similar distribution, the adversarial property will be largely compromised. As a comparison, our method
does not need to have prior knowledge regarding the distribution when generating adversarial examples, thus we could
have better general robustness. Meanwhile our method is complementary to EOT.
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4.2 Weighted perturbation technology
WPT can reduce the time cost by adjusting the weights of distortion in a different position. We first point out the
limitations of traditional loss function `(·) (Eq. 1) and then give our solution. (Again, we introduce WPT based on CTC
sequence loss, actually, WPT is a general method and can be easily applied to attack other ASR systems.)
Current Problem. By analyzing the process of generating audio adversarial examples, we found that the closer the
currently transcribed phrase p′ is to the target text t, the longer it takes. In order to divide this process into different
stages, we introduce the Levenshtein Distance [30], which is a string metric for measuring the minimum number of
single-character edits (i.e. insertions, deletions or substitutions) required to change one string into the other. According
to our statistics, the average percentage of time loss spent on the Levenshtein distance from 3 to 2, 2 to 1 and 1 to 0 are,
respectively, 7.52%, 15.43%, and 32.16%. Their sum exceeds 55% of the generation time. The reason for spending
a lot of time at these stages is that when Levenshtein Distance is small, most of the current points no longer need to
be perturbed, except for those points which cause the Levenshtein Distance not to be 0. We name these points as key
points.
On the one hand, if we can give these key points larger weights, the time spent at this stage will be reduced; on the
other hand, if the global search step size can be reduced with the number of iterations, then we can avoid missing a
more perfect adversarial example due to over perturbing. These two aspects will make the overall speed be accelerated.
Steps of WPT: Accordingly, we implement WPT in two steps. The first step focuses on shorting the time cost when
Levenshtein Distance equals to 1 by increasing the weights of key points. Therefore, we need to know which points are
key points.
Audio Sequence Location(ASL) is a model to help us locate these key points in the audio. As shown in Figure 2 (right),
the inputs of ASL are current transcribed phrase p′ and target t ( 1 ). After comparing p′ and t, we get the different
characters ( 2 ). Find the positions of these characters in the sequence of tokens pi ( 3 ). Output the intervals set χk in
audio vector x ( 4 ). Finally, the distortion corresponding to these k positions in χk are multiplied by weights ω. Our
improved formulation of `(·) is,
`(x, δ, t) = `model(f(x+ α · δ), t) + c · `metric(x, x+ δ),
αi =
{
ω, if i ∈ χk
1, else
, ω > 1,
(8)
where α is a weights vector to δ, and if the vector subscript i belongs to the intervals set χk, we give these key points
bigger weights ω.
Besides, when we short Levenshtein Distance to 0, WPT goes to its second step to reduce the learning rate lr:
lr ← β · lr, (9)
where constant β satisfies β ∈ (0, 1). After updating lr, we can calculate the perturbations δ on each iteration:
δ0 = 0, δn+1 ← δn − lr · sign(∇δ`(x, δ, t)), (10)
where ∇δ`(x, δ, t) is the gradient of ` with respect to δ.
Advantages: Carlini&Wagner try to set different weights to each character of the sequence of pi to solve this problem
[14]. Actually, it will cost prohibitive computation to find the most suitable weight for each character. So, they have to
get a feasible solution x0 which is found by using the normal CTC-loss function first and then using their improved
method based on x0. However, this is not a perfect solution to solve the problem mentioned before. There are three
advantages to our WPT:
1. Their method has to find a feasible solution x0 first, which means they can not short the time cost before generating a
successful adversarial example. Actually, this period of time accounts for more than 55% of the total time. We can use
ASL at any iterations to get the key location intervals χk without having to obtain x0 first. Then we make converge
faster by adjusting the weight ω of δ.
2. WPT is effective against both a greedy decoder and beam-search decoder [24], which are two searching ways
combined with CTC to obtain the alignment pi, while their method is only effective against greedy decoder. The reasons
are a) Instead of adjusting the weight of a single character or token, we adjust the weights of a continuous interval
on the audio vector corresponding to the character. This distortion based on the continuous interval is effective for
beam-search decoder. b) WPT updates weights ω according to the current alignment pi instead of a fixed pi0. So our
method won’t be limited to the greedy decoder.
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3. The learning rate lr, that gradually decreases as the distortion δ is reduced, can help us avoid the problem of excessive
perturbations due to too long steps so that better adversarial examples can be found more quickly.
4.3 Investigation of metrics
As for `metric, which is the other part of `(·), also plays an important role in the generation of adversarial audio.
Different from the image domain where mainly lp-based metrics are used as `metric, there is no study on which metric
should be selected.
The purpose of `metric is to limit the difference between the adversarial examples and the original samples. Therefore,
we introduce the Total Variation Denoising (TVD) to reduce the noise perturbed and let adversarial examples sound
more like the original audio. TVD is based on the principle that signals with excessive and possibly spurious detail have
high total variation and is mostly used in the process of noise removal [31]. After the TVD process, we can remove
most of the impulse in the adversarial examples and make the distortion more imperceptible. The `metric based on
TVD can be calculated via the sum of closeness E(δ) and total variation V (x+ δ):
`tvdmetric(x, δ) = E(δ) + γ · V (x+ δ)
=
1
n
n∑
i=0
(δi)
2 + γ ·
n−1∑
j=1
|(xj+1 + δj+1)− (xj + δj)| ,
(11)
where γ is a trade off adjusted of E(δ) and V (x+ δ). Besides, we also investigate other three types of similarity metrics
which are selected in terms of 1) l∞ in image domain; 2) l2-based in current audio domain; and 3) cosine distance in
information retrieval domain; as shown in Formula 12.
`1metric(x, δ) = l∞(x, x+ δ)
`2metric(x, δ) = l2(x, x+ δ)
`3metric(x, δ) = (1− cor(x, x+ δ))
, (12)
where l∞(·), l2(·) and cor(·) are, respectively, the measurement of l∞ distance, l2 distance and cosine distance between
two audio vectors.
A good choice of `metric not only accurately reflects the auditory difference between the two audio frequencies but
also avoids the optimization process oscillating around a solution without converging [3]. We give a comparison of the
effects of various loss functions in the experimental section.
5 Experimental results
In this section, we show the evaluation of our adversarial attack used the technologies introduced in Section 4. We also
study the performance of different `metric on success rate, SNR and dBx(δ). Our experimental results show that our
approach has faster generation speed, better SNR, higher success rate, and stronger robustness than other attacks.
5.1 Dataset and experimental settings
Dataset. Mozilla Common Voice dataset2 (MCVD): MCVD is an open and publicly available dataset of voices
that everyone can use to train speech-enabled applications. It consists of voice samples require at least 70GB of
free disk space. We follow the convention in the field and use the first 100 test instances of this dataset to generate
audio adversarial examples. Unless otherwise specified, all our experimental results are averaged over these 100
instances.
Environment. All experiments are carried out on an Ubuntu Server (16.04.1) with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2603
@ 1.70GHz, 16G Memory and GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
5.2 Experiments
5.2.1 Evaluating adversarial examples
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of our approach, we compared it with other two methods, Carlini & Wagner’s
attack [14] and CommanderSong [16]. Table 1 gives the success probability, average SNR, dBx(δ) and efficiency for
our method and two other state-of-the-art methods. For our method, we use SPT and WPT to improve the generation,
use Eq. 7 as `model and set `tvdmetric as our `metric (Eq. 11), and the proportion of perturbed points is chosen to be 75%.
2https://voice.mozilla.org/en/datasets
6
A PREPRINT - JUNE 7, 2019
Table 1: Evaluation of our adversarial attack with Commander Song and C&W’s attack.
Attack Approach Target phrase Prop. ↓ Effi.(s) ↓ Succ. ↑ dBx(δ) ↑ ** SNR ↑
Our attack Random phrases* 75% 251 1 46.92 31.9
C&W’s attack Random phrases* all points ≈3600 1 38 -**
CommanderSong echo open thefront door
all points 3600 1 - ** 17.2
okay google
restart phone now
all points 4680 1 -** 18.6
* As is selected in C&W’s work: target phrase is chosen at random such that (a) the transcription is incorrect
(b) it is theoretically possible to reach that target.
** dBx(δ) is a l∞ metric defined by C&W [14]. And "-" means no relevant data was provided in their papers.
As shown in Table 1, our fast approach shorts the generation time from one hour to less than 5 minutes by focusing on
the key points and dynamic learning rate to accelerate the converge. In addition, our adversarial examples also have a
better average of dBx(δ) and SNR, that is, we use less calculation time and get better results. More importantly, our
approach has better robustness which is shown in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.2 Evaluating robustness to noise
As we mentioned in Eq.5, we evaluate the robustness of audio adversarial examples by adding noises to them and
checking their adversarial properties. The process of adding noises is equal to apply transformation function t ∼ T over
the input audio. In our experiments, we set T as the uniform distribution with the boundary of ±4. We respectively
added noises to SPT-based, EOT-based and SPT-EOT-based adversarial examples. Then we transcribed the newly
obtained audio and finally calculate WER and Robustness Rate. If the newly transcribed phrase is the same as before,
we say that this audio successfully bypassed the noise defense.
As shown in Table 2, mostly SPT-based method performs better than EOT-based method in terms of WER. The
EOT-based audio has a higher Robustness Rate when its distribution is the same or similar to the noise distribution.
However, the SPT-based audio exhibits more general robustness. More specifically, in SPT, the smaller the proportion,
the better the robustness, but too small proportion results in a decrease in SNR and success rate. Fortunately, the
SPT-EOT-based approach combines the advantages of both methods and performs well in all aspects. We recommend
using the SPT-EOT-based approach to increase robustness in future work.
Table 2: The robustness against noise from4 = 5 to4 = 30.
Approach
4 = 5 4 = 15 4 = 30
Rob. ↑ WER ↓ Rob. ↑ WER ↓ Rob. ↑ WER ↓
baseline (C&W’s attack) 0.23 0.49 0.04 0.81 0.01 0.93
EOT-based (4 = 5) 0.25 0.46 0.06 0.74 0.02 0.94
EOT-based (4 = 15) 0.63 0.16 0.07 0.56 0.02 0.92
EOT-based (4 = 30) 0.74 0.04 0.29 0.23 0.04 0.70
SPT-based (prop. =5%) 0.71 0.04 0.4 0.22 0.27 0.39
SPT-based (prop. =30%) 0.58 0.15 0.21 0.33 0.11 0.58
SPT-based (prop. =75%) 0.42 0.21 0.18 0.50 0.06 0.72
SPT-EOT-based (75%,30) 0.85 0.03 0.30 0.19 0.09 0.53
5.2.3 Investigation of different `metric
In this experiment, we generate adversarial examples based on `model (defined in Section 4.1) and four different `metric
(from Eq. 11 to Eq. 12). For each specific loss function, we conduct adversarial attacks both with SPT (under the
proportion of 75%) and WPT.
The results in Table-3 suggest that `0 has the best performance on SNR, dBx(θ) and success rate. Besides, because the
TVD process eliminates the harsher impulse noises, the added perturbation "sounds" more imperceptible. As a result,
although the SNR and dBx(θ) of `0 are not greatly improved in numerical value, its adversarial audio sounds quite
better. Here we again suggest you listen to our demos on the website has given before.
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Table 3: Evaluation of different loss functions in our adversarial attacks.
Loss functions * SNR ↑ dBx(δ) ↑ Succ. ↑
`0 = `model + c0 · `tvdmetric 31.9 46.92 1
`1 = `model + c1 · `1metric 29.17 44.55 0.97
`2 = `model + c2 · `2metric 30.2 44.91 1
`3 = `model + c3 · `3metric 30.1 44.63 0.98
* We tried our best to tune every constant c of different `metric for a fair
comparison. We refer interested readers to our appendix for setting details.
The overall performances of `1 and `3 are not satisfactory. Since the maximum value in the audio vector is impossible
to measure the magnitude of the two small disturbances under the same maximum value. It also proves that the
character of the cosine distance is more suitable for audio similarity measurement. Because l2 distance can reflect all
the perturbation of audio, `2 has a better performance than `1 and `3, especially on the success rate. However, it’s still
worse than `0 on SNR and dBx(θ).
Combined the experimental results and the process of tuning, we conclude that a good loss function should satisfy the
following three characteristics: 1) The value ranges of `model and c · `metric should be the same order of magnitude; 2)
It should ensure that the value of `model are relatively larger in the initial stage, so that a feasible solution can be found
as soon as possible; after finding a feasible solution, the weight of `metric should increase, because it is necessary to
find a feasible solution that is closer to the original sample; 3) Considering the characteristic of sound, a metric in audio
area instead of general metric can lead to a more imperceptible adversarial audio.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a weighted-sampling audio adversarial example attack. The experimental results show that our
method has faster speed, fewer noises, and stronger robustness. More importantly, we are the first to introduce the factor
of the numbers and weights of perturbed points into the generation of audio adversarial examples. We also introduce
TVD to improve the loss function. The study of the effectiveness of loss function shows there are some differences
between the adversarial examples on image and audio. It also guides us on how to construct a more appropriate loss
function in the future. Our future work will focus on the defense of audio adversarial examples.
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Appendices
A Notations and Definitions
All notations and definitions used in our paper are listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Notations and Definitions used in our paper.
x The original input audio
δ The distortion to the original audio
t The targeted texts
f(·) The threat model
`(·) The loss function to generate audio adversarial examples
`model(·) The loss function to measure the difference between the current output
of the model and the targeted texts
`metric(·) The loss function to limit the difference between the adversarial examples
and the original samples
p The phrase of the semantic information of original audio
p′ The current transcribed phrase by ASL
y The probability distribution over the transformed characters
pi The sequence of tokens
n The length of the original audio vector
m The length of the perturbed audio vector
χ the key location interval set
c A hyperparameter to balance the importance of `model and `metric
ω The weights of key points
α The weights of δ
lr The learning rate in gradient descent
β A hyperparameter to control the rate of decrease of the learning rate
∇δ`(·) The gradient of `(·) with regard to δ
E(·) The sum of closeness
V (·) The total variation
γ A hyperparameter to balance the importance of E(·) and V (·)
lp(·) The lp distance, such as l0, l2, and l∞ etc.
cor(·) The cosine distance
B Implementation Details
For reproducibility, here we give the hyperparameters used in our experiments.
B.1 Evaluating adversarial examples
In this experiments, we generate audio adversarial examples with SPT and WPT and we select `tvdmetric as `metric. The
searching decoder is a beam-search decoder. The max iteration is set to be 500, which is enough for our method to
generate imperceptible adversarial examples. In SPT, the proportion of perturbed points is 75%. In WPT, we set the
weights of key points to be 1.2, the learning rate begins with 100 and β is set to be 0.8. lr will be updated by β · lr, if
the iterations%50 == 0 and we have generated at least one adversarial example by now. The hyperparameters c and γ
are 0.001 and 10.
B.2 Evaluating robustness to noise
Most of the hyperparameters are set to be the same as Section B.1 except that the proportion of perturbed points are 5%,
15%, 30%, 75%, respectively.
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B.3 Investigation of different lmetric
Most of hyperparameters are set to be the same as Section B.1. And c1, c2, c3 are 0.01, 0.001, 1, respectively.
C Transcription Examples
Some of the transcription examples are shown in Table 5. All of the phrases are selected randomly from the MCVD.
Table 5: Some of the transcription examples.
Original phrase 1 he thought of all the married shepherds he had known
Targeted phrase 1 we’re refugees from the tribal wars and we need money the other
figure said
Original phrase 2 i told him we could teach her to ignore people who waste her
time
Targeted phrase 2 down below in the darkness were hundreds of people sleeping in
peace
Original phrase 3 but finally the merchant appeared and asked the boy to shear four
sheep
Targeted phrase 3 it seemed so safe and tranquil
Original phrase 4 this is no place for you
Targeted phrase 4 but finally the merchant appeared and asked the boy to shear four
sheep
Original phrase 5 some of the grey ash was falling off the circular edge
Targeted phrase 5 we’re refugees from the tribal wars and we need money the other
figure said
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